H2
This was the hearing of a preliminary issue in an appeal to the Appointed Person from a decision of the Intellectual Property Office ("IPO") in opposition proceedings. The question was whether someone themselves appointed to decide such appeals under s.77 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 ("the 1994 Act") could properly accept instructions and appear as counsel in contested appeal proceedings under s.76 of the 1994 Act before another Appointed Person. At first instance both parties had been represented by persons appointed under s.77 of the 1994 Act. However the appellant had since changed counsel. The Appointed Person allocated to hear the present appeal had drawn the attention of the parties to the practice that a party wishing to be represented by such a person on such an appeal should obtain the formal consent of the other party or parties to the appeal. The appellant had indicated that it did not consent in the present case. However the respondent did not accept that consent was necessary. Further, even if this was wrong, it argued that the right course was to refer the appeal to the High Court under s.76(3) of the 1994 Act. Alternatively, the respondent argued that the hearing of the present preliminary issue and/or the present application should be transferred to the High Court.
H3
The respondent accepted the explanation given for the appellant's change of representation, namely that counsel appearing below did not considered it appropriate to appear on the appeal in the light of the concerns raised in Monroe's Trade Mark Application 1 . The key question was whether appeal hearings before the Appointed Person would comply with art.6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") and art.47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("the Charter"), i.e. the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, if representation by a party to such an appeal by someone themselves appointed to hear such an appeal was permitted. Both sides accepted that the common law test of bias (apparent or otherwise) was the same as the requirements for structural independence and objective impartiality under art.6 ECHR. 
H4
The Registrar had made written submissions indicating that, should a finding be made in the appellant's favour on this issue, then the appeal should be referred to the High Court. Counsel for the respondent indicated that, should the preliminary issue be determined in the appellant's favour and the appeal not be referred to the High Court, he would withdraw as counsel on the substantive appeal.
Held, find for the appellant on the preliminary issue,
H5
(1) The Appointed Person was under an obligation to ensure that appeals under s.76 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 ("the 1994 Act") were so far as possible determined in conformity with art. 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") and gave effect to art.47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("the Charter"). (4) It was not acte clair that the Appointed Person appeal tribunal could objectively be viewed as independent and impartial in a situation where each and every member of that group of judges was entitled both to hear appeals sitting as a sole judge and to appear as advocate/representative for the appellant/respondent on a different occasion at an appeal hearing in front of another member of that group of judges. Had both parties not urged the Appointed Person to decide the issue, the question would have been referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. (5) The requests to transfer to the High Court were refused: (i) they were made out of time and the Appointed Person had no power to extend the time limit; (ii) the appeal itself involved no point of general legal importance which would warrant referral; (iii) transfer would mean that the preliminary issue would simply go away and render the present exercise meaningless; and (iv) it would set a bad precedent as it would have the potential for tactical use and in certain circumstances might deny a party an [2018] R.P.C. 10 451 [2018] (8) The spectrum of thought which would occur to the notionally fair minded and informed observer might reasonably include whether a party might unfairly benefit from representation by an advocate with inside knowledge, whether determinations might be subconsciously swayed or otherwise influenced by considerations in another case before the tribunal on which the judge was acting as advocate for a party, whether allocations of appeal might be partial, and whether embarrassment or prejudice might be caused through criticism in argument by a member of the tribunal acting as advocate of a decision of the tribunal perhaps including those of the Appointed Person hearing the case. Further, although that person might know of the judicial traditions in the UK and the high standards expected of qualified lawyers and attorneys, attitudes changed and the overriding consideration was that justice had to be seen to be done. (9) The concerns raised in Monroe and the consequent practice adopted by the tribunal were both justified and necessary to preserve the ongoing integrity of the tribunal and it could not be said to comply with art.6 ECHR were it to adopt as a rule that its members were free to appear as advocates of any party before the tribunal in the absence of informed consent. 
5
The respondent took issue with the grounds for refusal, and to any necessary extent relied on acquired distinctiveness through use (proviso to s.3(1)). 6
The oppositions were consolidated by the UKIPO with both parties filing evidence, and came to be heard by Mr. Mark Bryant, for the Registrar, on 17 November 2016. 7
At that hearing, the appellant was represented by Ms. Emma Himsworth Q.C. instructed by Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP ("Pillsbury"). Mr. James Mellor Q.C. instructed by Haseltine Lake LLP ("Haseltine Lake") appeared for the respondent. (e) The marks were allusive of the information (i.e., "inside" information/ business information) contained in, but did not describe the characteristics of, news publications. That was also true of the other goods and services where connections were remoter. (h) There was no basis in the claim of bad faith under s.3(6). To the contrary, the applications were made to protect legitimate earlier rights.
The appeal

10
On 21 February 2017, the appellant filed notice of appeal to the Appointed Person against the hearing officer's decision under s.76 of the Act.
BUSINESS INSIDER was not opposed under s.3(1)(d).
[2018] R.P.C. 10 455 [2018] On receipt of the appeal papers I was told that Ms. Himsworth would not be representing the appellant on appeal. 13
In subsequent correspondence conducted through the Government Legal Department ("GLD") 3 I learnt that:
(a) The appellant was to be represented at the appeal hearing by Mr. Guy Hollingworth of counsel 4 .
(b) The respondent intended to continue its representation by Mr. Mellor 5 .
14 On 7 June 2017, I had issued directions as above drawing the parties' attentions to the decision of Mr. Geoffrey Hobbs Q.C. sitting as the Appointed Person in Munroe's Trade Mark Application, BL O/220/08
6 . In accordance with the established practice of the Appointed Person since the issues identified and concerns raised by Mr. Hobbs in Munroe, I pointed out that should the respondent wish to be represented at the appeal hearing by Mr. Mellor, who was appointed as an Appointed Person, then the formal consent of the appellant would be required. Indeed, the need for such consent appeared to be recognised by the respondent in a letter to the GLD from its representatives, Haseltine Lake, dated 9 June 2017. 15
By a letter dated 13 June 2017, the appellant through its representatives Pillsbury informed me that: ". . .. the Appellant does not consent to the Respondent being represented by an Appointed Person before the Appointed Person and as such does not consent to Mr James Mellor Q.C. representing the Respondent at the appeal hearing. As noted in your letter [GLD letter, 7 June 2017] Ms Emma Himsworth Q.C. who appeared for the Appellant at the first instance hearing before the Registrar will not be appearing for the Appellant on appeal, the Appellant having indeed selected new counsel to represent it at the appeal hearing who is not an Appointed Person."
16
At my invitation, the respondent through its representatives Haseltine Lake in a letter dated 13 July 2017, gave its response to Pillsbury's first paragraph cited above. In brief:
(i) The necessity for/relevance of the appellant's consent was denied.
(ii) Both parties were represented before the registrar without objection by counsel who sit as the Appointed Person. (iii) The appellant's choice of new counsel could be an attempt to force the respondent to change its counsel. (iv) Reasons why the respondent was unwilling to change its counsel included:
(a) his familiarity with the case/arguments; (b) the outcome at first instance; (c) cost; (d) lack of reason to do so.
(v) Mr. Mellor felt obliged to continue to represent his client, and saw no reason not to do so. (vi) Somewhat surprisingly, that Munroe indicated that there was no objection to one Appointed Person appearing before another on appeal. I think it was accepted on both sides by the preliminary hearing that this was an incorrect interpretation of the observations of Mr. Hobbs in Munroe (the point at issue having not been decided in that case).
17 On 14 July 2017, I issued directions through the GLD inviting sequential submissions from the appellant, the respondent and the Registrar on the objection to Mr. Mellor representing the respondent at the hearing of the substantive appeal, which was clearly a live and contentious issue. 18 I indicated that I would then appoint a hearing to resolve this preliminary issue, which in the event took place on 19 September 2017. 19
In the run-up to that hearing, by directions dated 11 September 2017, I drew the attentions of the parties and the Registrar to the following matters, which might or might not be considered relevant, and on which further submissions were invited before or at the hearing (without attachments): September 2017 include decisions of the CJEU/national courts with relevance to the EU harmonised trade marks laws and consequent practices, and imminent changes to the EUTM Regulations.
[2018] R.P.C. 10 457 [2018] ". . . that in order to establish whether a tribunal can be considered as "independent", regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence . . .
As to the question of "impartiality", there are two aspects to this requirement. First, the tribunal must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias. Secondly, it must also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is, it must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect . . . The concepts of independence and objective impartiality are closely linked and the Court will consider them together as they relate to the present case."
23
This was echoed by Mr. Hobbs in Munroe where he reflected on the need to recognise that independence and impartiality were linked in a way that required each of them to be seen as necessary for the attainment of the other ([14] ). 24
Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 ("the HRA") obligates the Appointed Person in hearing appeals from decisions of the Registrar under s.76 of the Act, to ensure that such appeals are so far as possible determined in conformity with art.6 of the ECHR 7 .
7 Section 6(1) HRA makes it "unlawful for a public authority [including a court or tribunal -s.6(3)] to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right". A complainant may rely on the Convention right in legal proceedings including an appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal (s. 7(1)(b) and (6)(b)). 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
42
. Such a right necessarily implies access for every person to an independent and impartial tribunal. Thus, as the Court has had occasion to state, the existence of guarantees concerning the composition of the tribunal are the corner stone of the right to a fair trial, compliance with which must in particular be verified by the Community judicature if an infringement of that right is complained of and the challenge on that point does not appear from the outset manifestly devoid of merit . . .
[. . .]
46. Furthermore, it must be observed that there are two aspects to the requirement of impartiality. In the first place, the tribunal must be subjectively impartial, that is, none of its members must show bias or personal prejudice, there being a presumption of personal impartiality in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In the second place, the tribunal must be objectively impartial, that is to say, it must offer guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect . . .".
UK law
29
Both sides also accepted that (since ". . . It can now be said that the approach should be:
"The court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It must then ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased . . ." 
Systemic or personal
34
An early difference between the parties was whether the objection was systemic or personal. I considered it to be systemic.
35
I agreed with Mr. Hollingworth that the issue more generally concerns whether this tribunal can be said to be art.6 of the ECHR-compliant in a situation where one Appointed Person appears as advocate for a party before another Appointed Person, and not whether there was any personal bias between myself and Mr. Mellor, which the parties agreed there was not. 36 I drew support in this first from Lawal (above). The issue in that case was:
". . . whether, in circumstances where a Queen's Counsel appearing on an appeal before the Employment Appeal Tribunal had sat as a part-time judge with one or both of the lay members (called "wing members") hearing that appeal, the hearing before the appeal tribunal could be said to be compatible with Mr. Hollingworth advised me that he had enquired into the position, and in DECADRON the normal practice of the Appointed Person since Munroe (as described at [14] above) was followed and the applicant/respondent provided its written consent to Ms. Michaels appearing at the appeal hearing and arguing the case for the opponent/appellant 9 . The respondent sensibly accepted this explanation. 
Strategy
43
It is convenient to mention here that Mr. Mellor also accepted Mr. Hollingworth's explanation that the reason for the change of counsel on the appellant's side was not down to some devious strategy but because, since Munroe, Ms. Himsworth does not consider it appropriate for her to appear in front of an Appointed Person on an appeal (transcript, p. 3).
Reference
CJEU
44
In implementing EU law (the absolute grounds for refusal/invalidity of registration), this tribunal is bound to give effect to the requirements in art.47 of the Charter, which it is accepted mirror those in art.6(1) of the ECHR. 45 Counsel were unable to refer me to any authority of the Strasbourg or Luxembourg courts that pertained directly to the preliminary issue in hand. 46 I do not consider it acte clair that the Appointed Person appeal tribunal, which consists entirely of part-time fee-paid judges whose decisions are final 10 , can objectively be viewed as independent and impartial in a situation where each and every member of that group of judges is entitled on the one hand to hear appeals sitting as a sole judge, and on the other hand to appear as advocate/representative for the appellant/respondent on a different occasion at an appeal hearing in front of another member of that group of judges. 47 Accordingly, I was minded make a reference of this question 11 to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling pursuant to art.267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") (OJ 2016 C 202/164) 12 . 48 That said, both parties urged me to decide the issue rather than make a reference to the CJEU 13 . Moreover, Mr. Mellor ended his skeleton argument on behalf of the respondent by stating: 9 I have taken to recording this process where applicable in the appeal decision itself, see e.g. Multibrands International Ltd's Trade Mark Application ("HUNNIES"), BL O/363/17, [31] . 10 Section 76(4) Act, subject only to judicial review. 11 Having obtained the input of the parties on the wording, although the question(s) would be mine. 12 The Appointed Person is qualified to have recourse to the preliminary-ruling procedure under art. 267 However before so doing, I will deal with: (1) the respondent's requests for references to the High Court; and (2) Mr. Mellor's counter-arguments to the appellant's objection based on the facts of UK case law.
High Court
51
In the respondent's first written submissions in response to the objection dated 11 August 2017, the respondent made a request to the Appointed Person to transfer what I understood as the substantive appeal to the High Court under s.76(3) of the Act. 52
The request was expressed to be conditional were I to find the appellant's objection to Mr. Mellor's representation was made out. It was further said that the appellant could hardly object since such a course would solve any problem of apparent bias. Fourth, and following on from the above, in my judgment it would set a bad precedent. Basically, if one party objects to representation by an advocate who is appointed as an Appointed Person, the other party seeks a referral to the High Court 15 . I agree with Mr. Hollingworth that this has the potential for tactical use (a motive already decried by the respondent), and that in certain circumstances a party might be denied an effective choice of fora (i.e., the appointed person or the court) for an appeal from a decision of the Registrar pursuant to s.76 of the Act 16 .
14 That is, unrelated to any personal attributes of Mr. Mellor or myself. 15 Irrespective of the nature of the content of the appeal. 16 Mr. Hollingworth referred me in support to the Guide to Judicial Conduct (discussed below) at para. 3.1 which states that: ". . . The consent of the parties is a relevant and important factor but the judge should avoid putting them in a position in which it might appear that their consent is sought to cure a ground for disqualification." I therefore agreed with the appellant that this would be neither an appropriate nor an acceptable solution.
Inherent Jurisdiction
59
I should add that the Registrar in his written submissions dated 31 August 2017, also advocated a reference to the court were I to make a finding of apparent bias in favour of the appellant's objection. 60 However, the Registrar's attitude appeared in the main to be based on uncertainty whether the Appointed Person had the power to require a party to appoint a different advocate in such circumstances. ". . . the court has inherent power to prevent abuse of its procedure and accordingly has power to restrain an advocate from representing a party if it is satisfied that there is a real risk of his continued participation leading to a situation where the order made at trial would have to be set aside . . . The judge has to consider the particular case with care . . . However, it is not necessary for a party objecting to an advocate to show that unfairness will actually result . . . it will be sufficient that there is a reasonable lay apprehension that this is the case . . . justice should not only be done, but seen to be done." I further note that whilst the attitude of the Registrar towards transfer is important, it is not decisive (GAP above, [13] , principle (f)).
Second request
64
By the time of the hearing, the respondent's request had morphed to include an additional or alternative application to transfer this preliminary issue to the High Court (respondent's skeleton argument dated 14 September 2017, para. 18). 65
It appeared to me that the points identified at [54]-[57] above applied with equal force to the respondent's additional/alternative request for transfer (or indeed more force, since it was made at such a late stage). 66 Accordingly, I likewise refused the second request.
Analogies
67
Mr. Mellor sought to counter the appellant's objection by reference to the facts of decided UK case law, which he asserted fell into two camps involving: (1) qualified lawyers, where there was no apparent bias; and (2) lay persons, where apparent bias was found to exist. His underlying objective was to persuade me that the relationships concerned in the first camp were more objectionable than that presently under consideration, whereas the principles emerging from the second camp were "The informed observer will therefore be aware that in the ordinary way contacts between the judiciary and the profession should not be regarded as giving rise to a possibility of bias. On the contrary, they promote an atmosphere which is totally inimical to the existence of bias . . ."
69
Mr. Mellor also relied heavily on the practice of deputy High Court judges appearing as barristers/advocates in the High Court. However, the obvious differences include that not all judges in the High Court are part-time fee-paid, the ranges of matters falling to be heard by the High Court are much wider, and there is a full right of appeal to a higher authority. By contrast, there are no full-time members of the Appointed Person tribunal (all are part-time fee-paid), the issues are relatively limited (i.e., appeals against decisions of the Registrar under the Act), and decisions of the Appointed Person are final subject only to judicial review (see below). 70
In this first camp, the respondent finally pointed to the apparently accepted fact that Appointed Persons appear as advocates in proceedings before the Registrar. There was some disagreement between the parties as to exactly what was decided in Munroe, above. I reminded the parties that Appointed Persons appearing before the Registrar was not the issue before me. 71 Further I noted that in Munroe, when dismissing the applicant's request to amend its grounds of appeal to allege breach of art.6 of the ECHR in the Registry, Mr. Hobbs regarded as compelling ( [20]): ". . . the cessation of any argument or doubt of the registrar's decision in the present case established being subject to review by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law with full jurisdiction to deal with the decision of the registrar as the nature of the case requires . . ."
18 .
72
In the second camp, I was referred to: "Pill L.J. thought that a part-time judge who subsequently appears as an advocate "is likely to be treated by lay members with an additional degree of authority" (para 36). He explained (para 39):
"The fair-minded and informed lay observer will readily perceive, I have no doubt, the collegiate spirit in which the Appeal Tribunal operates and the degree of trust which lay members repose in the presiding judge. It is in my judgment likely to diminish public confidence in the administration of justice if a judge who enjoys that relationship with lay members, with the degree of reliance placed on his view of the law, subsequently appears before them as an advocate. The fair-minded observer might well reasonably perceive that the litigant opposed by an advocate who is a member of the Tribunal and has sat with its lay members is at a disadvantage as a result of that association. A litigant's doubt about impartiality . . . would, for the reasons given, be a legitimate doubt. In my view, the procedure does not inspire public confidence."
Originally, Lawal concerned the broader question of whether it was objectionable in principle for the EAT to hear argument from one of its own members. That was narrowed down at an early stage to the systemic challenge described above. That said, it is noteworthy that the House of Lords found persuasive by analogy: (1) the restrictions on part-time Chairmen of the Employment Tribunal ("ET") appearing as advocates before employment tribunals in his or her region; (2) which restrictions would be known to the informed observer. . They might in that event, and following their morning greeting, thereafter have maintained friendly contact during the day, including during the two group sessions in the group to which they would find they had both been assigned. They might have had lunch together. Over the whole course of the day, they might therefore have established a friendly professional association of the sort that can readily arise between colleagues on such occasions. Had anything like that happened, it would, so it seems to me, be likely to have presented Mr Carter with a real sense of embarrassment when later he came to realise that Mr Whiteman was a respondent in Ms Bhardwaj's case. I regard it as likely that the fair-minded and informed observer would have scrutinised such circumstances with real care in forming his view as to whether they raised a real possibility of bias on the part of Mr Carter. He might well have concluded that they did."
And (Arden L.J., [97] ):
"It is an extraordinary fact of these race discrimination proceedings that three of the respondents and one of the witnesses for the applicant became lay members of the Employment Tribunals in the same or contiguous regions as those proceedings were taking place during the currency of the proceedings, and that two appointments of the respondents were only made known to the applicant during the trial of the proceedings. It is conceded that one of those appointments gave rise to apparent bias on the part of the panel hearing the case . . . The independence of the judiciary is a pearl above price in our society. The judiciary must also have the confidence of the public it serves."
Conclusion and immigration and asylum
73
I am grateful to counsel for their thorough review of the UK case law. However, I was directed to no case in point 19 , so that the analogies from the existing cases were of limited assistance there being no apparent personal bias in the present case, and this being the Appointed Person tribunal. 74
There was one further UK analogy, which I brought to the attention of the parties in the run up to the hearing (see [19] above). This was Adjudicator Guidance Note, Guidance for Part-Time Adjudicators, Guidance Note 1, November 2001 -https:// www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/immigration-and-asylum-tribunal-rulesandlegislation/ for the former Asylum and Immigration Tribunal ("AIT"), that is now a Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum") ("FTTIAC").
75
My understanding is that matters before the FTTIAC are generally presided over by a single judge (i.e., without "wing members"; Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the FTTIAC and Upper Tribunal Practice Statement, 25 September 2012, para. 2). 76
The Guidance Note inter alia amplified the general principle stated in the terms and conditions of service/appointment that a barrister or solicitor advocate ought not to sit as an Adjudicator or to appear before an AIT, at a particular hearing centre if they were liable to be embarrassed in either capacity by doing so. 77
The amplification clarified that barristers and solicitors with immigration practices should not be allocated to, nor sit at, regional hearing centres in which they normally practised.
The Appointed Person tribunal
78
Under s.76 of the Act, an appeal against any decision of the Registrar can be made either to the appointed person, or to the High Court or Court of Session (s. 75). 79
The appointed person is appointed by the Lord Chancellor in consultation with the Lord Advocate (s. 77(1) and (4)). At least in recent years, 1 or more of the appointed persons has participated in the appointment process for new members of the tribunal. 19 Apart from Munroe where the issue under consideration arose but was not decided due to the change of Counsel from Ms. Carboni, who was at the time an Appointed Person, to Mr. Mellor, who was not.
81
The eligibility conditions encompass inter alia subject to the 5-year time conditions: practising advocates/barristers, solicitors and chartered patent and trade mark attorneys; non-practising lawyers and attorneys with relevant legal experience; and academics with relevant legal qualifications. 82
The current term of appointment is 4 years renewable up to the age of 70, and appointed persons are expected to make themselves available for 30 sitting days per year (which includes writing up time). There are a number of grounds of removal including persistent failure to comply with sitting requirements without good reason. 83
Candidates for appointment must demonstrate knowledge of Intellectual Property Law and experience of applying the law. 84
The main activities of an appointed person listed in the latest Judicial Appointments Commission Information Pack, Fee-paid Appointed Person, Appeal Tribunal, Trade Marks 20 were described to include:
"Reading and assimilating papers in a case before it commences which may include evidential material previously submitted into the Registrar's proceedings by the parties.
Reviewing the decision under appeal determining whether the relevant law has been applied to the facts found and (where appropriate) examining the facts from evidence presented and considering whether the decision was procedurally fair. "3. Fee paid office holders must ensure that while holding judicial office they conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the authority and standing their office requires. They must not, in any capacity, engage in activity which might undermine, or be reasonably thought to undermine, their judicial independence. The governing principle is that no person should sit in a judicial capacity in any circumstances, which would lead an objective onlooker with knowledge of all the material facts to reasonably suspect that the person might be biased.
[ (II) comply with the existing case law governing pecuniary or other interests in deciding whether to declare an interest in, or to stand down from, a particular case.
(III) should not sit in any court locations where either they or any partner or employee of theirs regularly practises. This is to help avoid them being assigned to adjudicate in a case (or several cases) from which they would have to stand down . . ."
86
Further, the Guide to Judicial Conduct, published in March 2013, and amended in July 2016 (referred to in the above as "required reading") adds inter alia:
"3.17 The fee-paid judge has additional factors to consider when making a decision as to recusal. . . . The fee-paid judge may also, by virtue of professional practice, have links with chambers, professional firms and other parties which make it inappropriate for him or her to hear a case involving them or their clients. 3.18 The link need not be that of lawyer and client; a solicitor deputy district judge, for example, might not consider it appropriate to sit in judgment in cases involving a firm in professional competition with that fee-paid judge in the same district. By way of a further example, a fee-paid judge who is a barrister may have concerns about a member of his or her chambers who has entered into a conditional fee arrangement appearing before him or her. At many venues, the risk of recusal in civil proceedings is such that it is undesirable for a fee-paid judge to sit in the place of his or her legal practice." 
88
In Munroe itself, Mr. Hobbs mentioned as also indicative references in professional conduct rules 23 to the administration of justice being or appearing to be prejudiced by reason of a connection between the tribunal (or a member of it) and the representative of a party appearing before it giving rise to professional embarrassment (para. A26).
Make-up/characteristics of the tribunal
89
There were originally 3 Appointed Persons in trade marks appointed in 1996. This number subsequently rose to 5 and now stands at 9. 22 When Mr. Mellor was appointed. 23 There para. 603(d) of the Bar Council Code; see also s.38 of the Solicitors Act 1974.
90
Every member of the Appointed Person trade marks tribunal is fee-paid part-time. There was and is no full-time member. The Senior Appointed Peron, Mr. Hobbs, is in charge of the allocation of cases. As Mr. Hobbs remarked in Munroe (para. A32):
"The members of the tribunal work upon the basis that they will either hear the appeals that are allocated to them or in any case where they perceive themselves to be in a position of conflict or possible conflict arrange for the appeal to be reallocated to another member of the tribunal."
91
Although jurisdiction may be shared with the court, in any year, the Appointed Person hears around 90% of appeals from decisions of the Registrar under the Act. 92
As already stated, the Appointed Person has power under s.76(3) in given circumstances to refer an appeal to the court. Otherwise, the Appointed Person must hear and determine the appeal, and his or her decision is final (s. 76(4)). That does not exclude the possibility of judicial review, which I observe is no answer to Article 6 of the ECHR lack of independence/impartiality (P, Territorially the jurisdiction of the Appointed Person tribunal is not limited to England and Wales, but covers in addition Northern Ireland and Scotland. There are no regions as such. Essentially, the hearing centre is London. The tribunal may make orders for reference under art.267 of the TFEU (fn. 12 above). 94
Matters are dealt with in the Appointed Person tribunal by a single judge, who acts independently of the others, although the desirability in so far as possible for consistency in decision-making is well recognised within the group (Guide to Judicial Conduct, para. 2.4). 95
There is usually an oral hearing although appeals may be dealt with on the papers. Like in the present case, preliminary issues may need prior determination. 96
Parties may professionally be represented in the tribunal by barristers, solicitors, or attorneys, or non-professionally by directors, officers, managers, partners, colleagues, family or friends. That said, there is no requirement for representation, and it is quite common for parties to represent themselves as litigants in person. 97
The Appointed Persons as a group meet annually with the UKIPO to review the system. As Mr. Hollingworth reminded me, it is not unknown 24 for legal issues to be discussed The Appointed Persons as a group also attend annually the EUIPO in Alicante, Spain 25 for a full-day meeting at which aspects of EU trade marks law and practice are discussed. 99
There are (or have been) other occasions where the Appointed Persons meet as a group (e.g., Meeting of Trade Marks Judges, London, November 2014). 100
Finally, I think it fair to say that the Appointed Person tribunal has made a significant contribution to the development of UK and European trade marks law and practice. 24 But, I would say uncommon. 25 Accompanied by members of the UKIPO.
I do not think that the Appointed Person tribunal could be said to be art. 6 of the ECHR-compliant were it to adopt a rule that its members were free to appear as advocates for any party before the tribunal in the absence of the informed consent of the other party. 109
In my judgment, were that to represent the case, the notional fair-minded and informed observer would have legitimate reason to question the independence and impartiality of the tribunal. 110 I recognise that that this will place a limitation on those who would seek to become, and become an appointed person. However, this merely confirms the practice of the tribunal since Munroe, and is vital to ensure that justice is not only done, but seen to be done (Geveran above, [42] ). 111 I therefore find in favour of the appellant's objection. 112
Mr. Mellor graciously agreed that in this event 26 he would retire as counsel appearing for the respondent in the substantive appeal, which avoids the necessity for such an order. 113
As soon as the respondent has chosen a new counsel/advocate to represent it, the parties should jointly put forward to me through the GLD (quoting reference number Z1707487/MIE/A5) some suitable dates when their representatives would be available for the hearing of the substantive appeal. This should be done within 1 month of the date of this decision (i.e., 28 January 2018). 114 I will then appoint a date and time for the hearing by me of the substantive appeal.
doi:10.1093/rpc/rcy030 Online publication 28 August 2018 26 And the non-referral to the court, see paras.
[51]-[66] above.
